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Has the Supreme Court Taken a Wrong
Turn? An Analysis of the Supreme Court's
Decision in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista
Elizabeth C. Tucker*
I. Introduction
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Atwater v. City of Lago
Vista1 makes driving in America a dangerous pursuit for persons of
minority races. In Atwater, a woman was stopped by a police officer for
failing to buckle her and her children's seatbelts.2 After stopping Ms.
Atwater and verbally berating her, the police officer handcuffed Ms.
Atwater and took her to the police station, where she was forced to
remove her shoes, eyeglasses, and jewelry and submit to having her
"mug shot" taken before being placed in a jail cell.3
Because the legality of the traffic stop was never in question, a
majority of the Justices denied Ms. Atwater's contention that her arrest
violated the Fourth Amendment's ban on unreasonable searches and
seizures.4 The Supreme Court rejected Ms. Atwater's claims that
English common law and American law restricted peace officers from
making warrantless arrests "except in cases of 'breach of the peace.' ' 5 In
discarding Ms. Atwater's Fourth Amendment claim, the Court created a
blanket rule that permits police officers to arrest, without a warrant,
persons who commit fine-only offenses in an officer's'presence.
6
Although the Atwater rule promotes the interests of law
enforcement,7 the Court's decision is analytically flawed, and the effects
* J.D. Candidate, The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State
University, 2003.
1. 532 U.S. 318 (2001).
2. Id. at 323-24.
3. Id. at 324.
4. Id. at 354-55.
5. Id. at 327. Ms. Atwater defined "breach of peace" as "nonfelony offenses
'involving or tending toward violence."' Id.
6. Id. at 354.
7. In his opinion for the majority, Justice Souter noted the importance of a concise
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of the decision are likely to be extreme. In the wake of Atwater, law
enforcement officers have "unbounded discretion" to stop and arrest
drivers for minor traffic violations.8 From a Fourth Amendment
perspective, such broad discretion creates the danger that police officers
will abuse their power by using traffic infractions "as an excuse for
stopping and harassing an individual." 9 Additionally, the added power to
arrest a driver increases the scope of permissible searches that an officer
may conduct, as well as increasing the likelihood that the officer will
elicit consent to search even in the absence of evidence of wrongdoing.
Further, the additional power vested in police officers by the
Atwater rule encourages them to engage in pretextual stops. For many
officers, this means using violations of the traffic code as an excuse to
target drivers for persecution based on their skin color.'0 As Justice
O'Connor implied in her dissent in Atwater, it is likely that persons of
color in America will witness an increase in racial profiling activity in
the aftermath of the Court's decision."
The Atwater decision is also faulty because the case manifests
insensitivity to the existence of widespread racism in America.
According to some legal scholars, racism has played a fundamental role
in shaping American cultural beliefs,12 and is reflected in government
actions.13 Professor Charles Lawrence opines that this racism, although
unconscious, nevertheless results in government policies that disparately
impact members of minority races. 14  The disparate effect of these
policies has a "cultural meaning" for members of society, and is often
perceived by observers as governmental endorsement of racism.
1 5
This comment addresses the analytical problems inherent in Atwater
and concludes that the negative effects of the decision on American
rule that police officers could apply without fear of "judicial second-guessing." Id. at
347.
8. Id. at 372 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also Whren v. United States, 517 U.S.
806 (1996); David A. Harris, "Driving While Black" and All Other Traffic Offenses: The
Supreme Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87 J. GRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 544 (1997).
9. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 372 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
10. See Ira Glasser, Racial Profiling and Selective Enforcement: The New Jim Crow,
THE BRIEF, Summer 2001, at 31, 32.
11. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 372 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
12. Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY 235, 237 (Kimberld Crenshaw et al.
eds., 1995); see also Sheri Lynn Johnson, Unconscious Racism and the Criminal Law, 73
CORNELL L. REV. 1016 (1988) (discussing ways in which unconscious racism affects the
American criminal justice system).
13. Lawrence, supra note 12, at 238 ("[Government] actors are themselves part of
the culture and presumably could not have acted without being influenced by racial
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society will outweigh the benefit of administrative convenience to police
and to the courts. Part II provides an overview of the Court's Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence with regard to. traffic stops, discusses the
Court's holding in Atwater, and describes the additional effects that
Atwater is likely to have on the Fourth Amendment and traffic stops.
Part III examines the effects of the Atwater decision with respect to the
practice of racial profiling and also seeks to demonstrate the racial
meaning inherent in the decision. Part IV concludes that the Supreme
Court's decision in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista is fundamentally
flawed, and, thus, that the Supreme Court should reconsider its recent
Fourth Amendment caselaw and expand its jurisprudence to reflect a
racially objective approach.
II. Background
The breadth of power allocated to police officers by the Fourth
Amendment has often been criticized as being too comprehensive.
16
Although searches and seizures ostensibly are governed by the
reasonableness standard, many scholars believe that the Supreme Court's
"traffic stop" jurisprudence has strayed far from the Fourth
Amendment's original purpose. 17 Further, the Court has been accused of
encouraging pretextual stops and discriminatory enforcement by
extending the search and seizure privileges afforded to police officers.
18
In light of the Court's prior Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the recent
decision in Atwater seems to be one more in a long line of cases limiting
Fourth Amendment liberties.' 
9
16. Leading Cases, 115 HARV. L. REV. 336, 336 (2001).
17. Peter Shakow, Casenote, Let He Who Never Has Turned Without Signaling Cast
the First Stone: An Analysis of Whren v. United States, 24 AM. J. CRIM. L. 627, 628
(1997) ("The discretion given to police officers in the context of traffic stops by Whren
and these other cases is antithetical to the purpose of the Fourth Amendment which is to
protect the personal privacy of citizens from unreasonable search and seizure.").
18. ld.
19. It appears that the Supreme Court intends to continue the trend of escalating
police powers under the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266
(2002), involved a driver who was stopped by a border patrol agent north of the United
States-Mexico border. Id. at 268. The detaining agent observed the vehicle after it
allegedly triggered a roadside sensor used to apprehend drug smugglers and illegal
immigrants. Id. at 269. The agent's suspicion was aroused by the driver of the van, who
seemed very stiff and refused to look at the officer as the van passed, and by the children
in the back seat, who appeared to have their feet propped up on some cargo on the floor
and were waving at the agent in an "abnormal pattern." Id. at 270-71. Upon stopping the
vehicle, the agent found close to 129 pounds of marijuana inside it. Id. at 272. The
driver argued that the agent lacked the requisite reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle.
Id. However, the Supreme Court denied that claim, holding that, under the totality of the
circumstances, the agent's factual inferences amounted to reasonable suspicion that the
driver was engaged in criminal activity. Id. at 277.
2003]
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A. The Fourth Amendment: Increased Discretion for Traffic Stops
The Fourth Amendment guarantees "the right of people to be secure
in their persons, houses, paper and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures., 20 The Supreme Court has generated a complex series of
rules governing the constitutionality of traffic stops. The basic rule is
that an officer can pull over a motorist as long as the officer has
reasonable suspicion or probable cause that a crime has been
committed.2 1 Significantly, an officer's subjective intent plays no role in
determining whether an officer has probable cause; thus, an officer's
motive is irrelevant so long as his behavior was objectively justifiable.2 2
In Whren v. United States,23 two African Americans were stopped for a
traffic violation and were charged with possession of cocaine that was
discovered during the stop.24 Two plainclothes vice-squad officers were
patrolling an area of Washington, D.C., notorious for drug trafficking
when the officers noticed a car occupied by two young African-
25American men. The car was stopped at a stop sign, and the officers
noted that the driver appeared to be looking at something in the
passenger's lap.26 According to the officers, the driver waited at the stop
sign for twenty seconds. Suspicions aroused, the two officers headed
towards the car when it "turned suddenly to its right, without signaling,
and sped off at an 'unreasonable' speed. 27 The officers stopped the car,
claiming that they had probable cause to believe that the driver had
violated District of Columbia traffic regulations requiring drivers to
"give full time and attention to the operation of the vehicle," to signal
before turning, and to drive at a prudent speed.28
The suspects argued that the stop was based on the race of the car's
occupants and moved to suppress the evidence on the ground that no
reasonable officer would have made the stop.29  In support of their
contention that a reasonable police officer would not have stopped their
car, the suspects relied on District of Columbia traffic regulations that
prohibited plainclothes officers in unmarked cars from enforcing traffic
20. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
21. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,
422 U.S. 873 (1975) (holding that traffic detentions are not reasonable under Fourth
Amendment standards unless the detaining officer has reasonable suspicion or probable
cause to stop the driver).
22. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996).
23. 517 U.S. 806 (1996).




28. Id. at 810.
29. Id. 809.
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laws except in instances where "'a violation. .. is so grave as to pose an
immediate threat to the safety of others."' 30  The Supreme Court held
that the officer's motive for stopping the vehicle was irrelevant, because
objective facts showed a violation of the traffic laws.3' Accordingly, the
officers' behavior was justifiable under the Fourth Amendment. 32 The
Court also refused to inquire whether a reasonable officer would have
made the stop, and noted that such an inquiry "although framed in
empirical terms... is plainly and indisputably driven by subjective
considerations. 33 Thus, under the Fourth Amendment probable cause to
stop a motorist exists wherever a police officer observes a traffic
violation, regardless of the true motivation for the stop and whether a
reasonable officer would have made the stop.
34
The practical effect of Whren was to give police officers
"extraordinarily wide latitude to stop motorists based on their own
discretion. '' 35 In the wake of Whren, police officers can stop a motorist
for even the most minor traffic violation. This may be a "moving
violation," such as speeding, or an "equipment violation," such as a
burned-out light.36 In addition to specific violations, many states allow
police officers to stop a driver whom the officer believes is acting
unreasonable or careless under the circumstances.37 Some commentators
have noted that it is undeniable that almost every car on the road violates
some traffic law. 38 Police officers certainly recognize the frequency with
which drivers commit traffic violations, and, in fact, some officers
admittedly use this knowledge as a means to stop and search suspicious
39vehicles or persons.
30. Id. at 815.
31. Id. at 813.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 814.
34. Id. at 808-09. It should be noted that the same result may not be true when a
police officer conducts a traffic stop based on reasonable suspicion rather than probable
cause. See id. at 817 (noting that balancing of governmental interests against level of
intrusion on individual rights is required when search and seizure is based on less than
probable cause).
35. Peter A. Lyle, Note, Racial Profiling and the Fourth Amendment: Applying the
Minority Victim Perspective To Ensure Equal Protection Under the Law, 21 B.C. THIRD
WORLD L.J. 243, 256 (2001).
36. Harris, supra note 8, at 558.
37. Id.; see, e.g., 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3714 (2002) ("Any person who drives a
vehicle in careless disregard for the safety of persons or property is guilty of careless
driving .... ).
38. Glasser, supra note 10, at 32; see also Harris, supra note 8, at 558 (noting that
the average American driver cannot drive three blocks without violating some traffic
law).
39. Harris, supra note 8, at 558 (citing LAWRENCE F. TIFFANY ET AL., DETECTION OF
CRIME 131 (1967)) (containing statements by police officers that "[y]ou can always get a
guy legitimately on a traffic violation if you tail him for a while, and then a search can be
2003]
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Once probable cause exists and an officer has pulled a driver over,
the officer can order the driver to step out of the vehicle pending
completion of the stop.40 Such actions by police officers do not violate
the Fourth Amendment's ban on unreasonable searches and seizures
because concern for the safety of the officer outweighs the minimal
intrusion on the driver.4 1  For similar reasons, officers are justified in
ordering passengers from a stopped vehicle.42 In addition, the detaining
officer can seize any evidence of criminal wrongdoing that is in the
officer's plain sight.43 Officers may also capitalize on their authority by
seeking consent to search vehicles, without advising drivers that they
have a right to refuse.44
During the stop, the detaining officer can conduct a protective
search of the driver, any passengers,45 and the interior of the automobile
in those areas where a weapon could be hidden.46 Although protective
frisks, often termed Terry47 frisks, may not be used to conduct general
searches, an officer can seize contraband discovered during a Terry frisk
if the incriminating nature of the evidence is immediately apparent.48
made," and that, "[i]n the event that we see a suspicious automobile or occupant and wish
to search the person or the car, or both, we will usually follow the vehicle until the driver
makes a technical violation of a traffic law [and t]hen we have a means of making a
legitimate search").
40. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 (1977) (holding that, once a car has
been detained for a traffic violation, it does not offend the Fourth Amendment for an
officer to order the driver out of the car).
41. Id.
42. Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 415 (1997) (holding that an officer may order
passengers out of the car pending completion of the traffic stop).
43. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466 (1971) (stating that evidence
discovered in plain view can be seized even if the officer comes across the object
"inadvertently").
44. Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S 33, 35 (1996) (holding that the Fourth Amendment
does not require police officers to inform lawfully detained individuals that they are "free
to go" before the individual's consent to a search is considered voluntary); Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 249-50 (1973) (holding that the Fourth Amendment requires
that police officers secure consent to search when the subject of the search is not in police
custody and that knowledge of the right to refuse consent to search is not a prerequisite to
voluntariness).
45. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26 (1968) (holding thatan officer's protective search
of an individual is "limited to that which is necessary for the discovery of weapons which
might be used to harm the officer of [sic] others nearby"); see also Mimms, 434 U.S. at
112.
46. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049 (1983) (holding that protective search
by the detaining officer may include the passenger compartment and any containers
located in the compartment in which weapons could reasonably be placed).
47. Terry, 392 U.S. 1.
48. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 379 (1993). In Minnesota v. Dickerson,
police stopped an individual suspected of drug trafficking and ordered him to submit to a
pat-down search. Id. at 369. The officer conducting the search felt a small lump in the
respondent's pocket that he suspected was cocaine. Id. In fact, the lump was cocaine,
[Vol. 107:3
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Likewise, the Fourth Amendment does not exclude any contraband other
than weapons discovered during an automobile search.49
B. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista
On March 26, 1997, Gail Atwater was driving her children home
from soccer practice through a suburban neighborhood at fifteen miles
per hour.50 Neither Ms. Atwater, her three-year-old son, nor her five-
year-old daughter was wearing a seatbelt.51 Officer Bart Turek of the
Lago Vista Police Department observed the violation and pulled Ms.
Atwater over.52 As he approached her truck, Officer Turek yelled to Ms.
Atwater that the two had met before and that she was "going to jail.,
53
Ms. Atwater was not carrying her driver's license or insurance papers as
required by Texas law because her purse had been stolen on the previous
day. 54 When she informed Officer Turek of this fact, he "ridiculed her
and implied that she was a liar.",55 Ms. Atwater then asked to take her
frightened children to a friend's home two doors away; Officer Turek
refused and told Ms. Atwater that he would take the children to the
police station with her.56  Officer Turek then arrested Ms. Atwater,
handcuffed her, and drove her to the police station, where she was
fingerprinted and photographed before being placed in a solitary cell for
an hour.
57
The City of Lago Vista charged Ms. Atwater with "driving without
her seatbelt fastened, failing to secure her children in seatbelts, driving
without a license, and failing to provide proof of insurance." 58 Two of
the charges were dismissed, and Ms. Atwater pled no contest to the
and the officer arrested the individual for possession of a controlled substance. Id. The
Supreme Court held that the search went beyond the permissible scope of a Terry frisk
because the officer conducting the search identified the contraband after he had
determined that the respondent had no weapon. Id. at 378-79.
49. Long, 463 U.S. at 1050.
50. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 165 F.3d 380, 382 (5th Cir. 1999), rev'd in part
en banc, 195 F.3d 242 (5th Cir. 1999), aff'd, 532 U.S. 318 (2001).
51. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 323-24. Texas law requires that front seat passengers wear
seatbelts if the automobile is equipped with them. Texas also requires drivers to buckle
up small children who are riding in the front seat. TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. §
545.413(a)-(b) (Vernon 1999 & Supp. 2002).
52. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 324.
53. Id.
54. Id. Texas law requires drivers to carry a valid license and proof of insurance.
TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. §§ 521.025, 601.053 (Vernon 1999).
55. Atwater, 165 F.3d at 382.
56. Id. In fact, Ms. Atwater's children were not taken to the police station with their
mother, but were entrusted to a neighbor of the Atwaters' who appeared at the scene. Id.




seatbelt offenses and paid a fifty-dollar fine.59
Ms. Atwater and her husband sued the City of Lago Vista, Officer
Turek, and Police Chief Frank Miller, alleging a violation of Ms.
Atwater's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable
seizure. 60 The United States District Court for the Western District of
Texas granted the City's motion for summary judgment.61 A panel of the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that an arrest for a first-
time seatbelt offense constituted an unreasonable seizure under the
Fourth Amendment.62
Sitting en banc, the court of appeals reversed the panel's decision.63
The court of appeals held that, because Officer Turek had probable cause
to arrest Ms. Atwater, and because there was no evidence that the arrest
had been conducted in a "manner... unusually harmful to [Ms.]
Atwater's privacy interests," the seizure was reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment.64
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the court of
appeals. Justice Souter, writing for the majority, held that, "if an officer
has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a
very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, without violating
the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender." 65  In reaching this
conclusion, Justice Souter first examined the Framers' understanding of
the Fourth Amendment term "reasonableness" by examining the power
of police officers to arrest at common law. 66 After a careful analysis of
cases, statutes, and treatises from medieval England to present day,
Justice Souter found Ms. Atwater's historical argument that the common
law prohibited warrantless misdemeanor arrests to be unconvincing. 67 In
support of this conclusion, Justice Souter observed that both English
common law and early American statutes regularly permitted warrantless
arrests for misdemeanor crimes. 68  Further, Justice Souter determined
that the Framers did not intend to limit the authority of peace officers to
59. Id.
60. Id. at 325.
61. Id.
62. Id. After conducting a balancing analysis of all relevant factors, the court held
that Ms. Atwater's arrest was "objectively unreasonable" under the totality of the
circumstances presented in this case. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 165 F.3d 380, 382
(5th Cir. 1999), rev'd in part en banc, 195 F.3d 242 (5th Cir. 1999), aft'd, 532 U.S. 318
(2001).
63. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 325.
64. Id. at 325-26.
65. Id. at 354.
66. Id. at 326-45.
67. Id. at 327; Leading Cases, supra note 16, at 338.
68. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 327-35.
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arrest for misdemeanors.69 In fact, he noted that "actual practice"
supported the contention that state legislatures intended to give peace
officers authority to arrest misdemeanor criminals without warrants in
cases of breach of the peace.7°  The historical analysis ended by
observing that, for more than a century, legislative and judicial tradition
has been supported by legal commentary recognizing that the
constitutionality of warrantless misdemeanor arrests is not limited to
breaches of the peace.7'
Justice Souter next examined Ms. Atwater's proposed constitutional
rule "forbidding custodial arrest[s], even upon probable cause, when
conviction could not ultimately carry any jail time and when the
government shows no compelling need for immediate detention." 72 In
declining to adopt such a rule, Justice Souter reasoned that the Fourth
Amendment does not easily lend itself to case-by-case analysis.73 The
opinion noted a need for "readily administrable rules"' 74 that law
enforcement officers can apply "on the spur of the moment" 75 and
reasoned that Ms. Atwater's proposed rule did not meet these criteria
because it would require officers on the street to be familiar with
"complex penalty schemes., 76  In addition, a flexible rule like Ms.
Atwater's would "guarantee increased litigation over many of the arrests
that would occur., 7 7 Lastly, Justice Souter suggested that, in the absence
of "an epidemic of unnecessary minor-offense arrests,, 78 a limitation on
warrantless arrests for misdemeanors is unwarranted.79
Justice O'Connor dissented on the ground that Ms. Atwater's arrest
69. Id. at 336.
70. Id. Justice Souter noted that, prior to the adoption of the Fourth Amendment,
many states had passed laws extending warrantless arrest authority to a variety of non-
violent misdemeanors. Id. He further noted that, in 1792, Congress vested federal
marshals with "the same powers ... as sheriffs and their deputies in the several states
have by law." Id. at 339.
71. Id. at 343-44 (noting that currently all fifty states and the District of Columbia
permit warrantless misdemeanor arrests by at least some law enforcement officers, even
in the absence of a breach of the peace).
72. Id. at 346.
73. Id. at 347 ("We have traditionally recognized that a responsible Fourth
Amendment balance is not well served by standards requiring sensitive, case-by-case
determinations of government need, lest every discretionary judgment in the field be
converted into an occasion for constitutional review.").
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 348.
77. Id. at 350. Justice Souter reasoned that these difficulties could not be solved
using a tie-breaker test, such as, "if, in doubt, do not arrest," because such a test would
create "a systematic disincentive to arrest in situations where ... arresting would serve an
important societal interest." Id. at 350-51.




was inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment's guarantee of
reasonableness.8 °  Justice O'Connor argued that, when history is
inconclusive, the Court must use a case-by-case balancing test to
determine reasonableness. 81 According to the dissent, the majority's rule
should be replaced with one that requires police officers to issue citations
for fine-only offenses unless the officer can identify "'specific and
articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from
those facts, reasonably warrant [the additional] intrusion' of a full
custodial arrest., 82  Applying this balancing test to Ms. Atwater's
situation, Justice O'Connor reasoned that the arrest was constitutionally
unreasonable because Officer Turek's actions "severely infringed
Atwater's liberty and privacy."
83
C. The Fourth Amendment in the Wake of Atwater v. City of Lago
Vista
The Supreme Court's ruling in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista not
only increased the powers bestowed upon police officers who make
traffic stops; it also further diminished the substance of the consent
doctrine. Atwater expanded the traditional traffic-stop arrest rule, which
provided that a police officer was empowered to arrest a driver pursuant
to probable cause that the driver had committed a crime, to allow arrest
based solely on "very minor criminal offense[s]" such as traffic
violations. 84  Concurrent with the power to arrest for minor criminal
offenses is a host of other highly invasive powers that police officers can
exercise. Upon a determination that there is probable cause to arrest the
driver or a passenger, the officer can perform a full body search incident
to that arrest.85 In such cases, the power to search derives from the arrest
80. Id. at 360 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 361 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
And when history is inconclusive ... we will "evaluate the search or seizure
under traditional standards of reasonableness by assessing, on the one hand, the
degree to which it intrudes upon an individual's privacy and, on the other, the
degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental
interests."
Id. (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999)).
82. Id. at 366 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21
(1968)).
83. Id. at 368 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). According to Justice O'Connor, "the
officer's actions cannot sensibly be viewed as a permissible means of balancing
Atwater's Fourth Amendment interests with the State's own legitimate interests." Id.
Justice O'Connor found it "difficult to see how arresting Atwater served either [the goal
of enforcing child welfare laws or the goal of general law enforcement] any more
effectively than the issuance of a citation." Id. at 369.
84. Id. at 354.
85. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (holding that a full body
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itself; therefore, the permissible scope of the search is broader than that
permitted by Terry.86 The arresting officer is also permitted to search the
passenger compartment of the automobile, including any containers
therein, after the arrest of the driver.87 Pursuant to the arrest, the officer
can impound the driver's vehicle and inventory all of its contents.88
Further, if the officer so chooses, the officer can take the arrestee to the
police station, where the suspect can be held for up to forty-eight hours
before a determination of probable cause is made. 89
As Justice O'Connor concluded in her dissent in Atwater, these
additional powers are likely to have adverse consequences on American
society.90 She expressed a legitimate concern that the majority conferred
"unfettered discretion" upon law enforcement officers to stop, arrest, and
search citizens "without articulating a single reason why such action is
appropriate." 91 In particular, this increased discretion is likely to have a
profoundly negative impact on the practice of racial profiling.
92
Increasing the scope of search and seizure powers that can be
exercised by the police during a traffic stop is only one of Atwater's
deleterious effects; far worse is the weakening blow that the Atwater
decision dealt to the consent doctrine. The consent doctrine is an
exception to both the warrant and probable cause requirements of the
Fourth Amendment under which a police officer may seek consent from
any person at any time, regardless of whether the officer suspects that
criminal activity is afoot. Consent searches are broader in scope than the
search incident to a lawful arrest does not require a warrant and is reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment).
86. Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 266 (1973) (holding that, incident to a lawful
arrest, an arresting officer is entitled to conduct a full body search of the driver even
though the officer did not suspect that the driver was armed).
87. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981) (holding that, when a lawful
arrest has been made, an officer may conduct a full search of the passenger compartment
and any containers therein).
88. Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 374 (1987) (holding that impoundment and
inventory procedures conducted in good faith by police officials pursuant to a lawful
arrest do not violate the Fourth Amendment).
89. County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991) (holding that
judicial determinations of probable cause that occur within forty-eight hours of arrest
satisfy the promptness requirement of the Fourth Amendment).
90. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 371 (2001) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
91. Id. at 372 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
92. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor argued that the substantial
discretion given to police officers allows officers to stop and harass drivers. Id. Further,
because an officer's motive is not reviewable by a court, it is the duty of the courts to
ensure that events that occur after the individual is detained comport with the
reasonableness guarantee. Id; see also Sarah Oliver, Atwater v. City of Lago Vista: The




searches described in the prior section, and, because consent searches
meet the constitutional standard of voluntariness, evidence discovered
during a consensual search may be used in court. Most significantly, the
Fourth Amendment does not require that a police officer inform
detainees that they have the right to refuse consent to search.93
Searches incident to traffic stops are generally based on consent
rather than any other warrant exception.94  Although consensual
encounters must be "voluntary," 95 it is commonly accepted that "consent
searches following valid motor vehicle stops are [often] not voluntary
because people feel compelled to consent for various reasons. 96 Such
reasons may include ignorance of the right to refuse or harassment by the
detaining officer.
97
Atwater impacts the consent doctrine because it gives police officers
yet another tactic for securing consent from an unwilling detainee while
still satisfying the voluntary standard. In the wake of Atwater, police
officers are likely to use the threat of their power to arrest as inducement
for procuring "consent" to search a detainee's vehicle.98 Further,
because officers are not constitutionally bound to advise detainees that
they are free to leave, 99 officers may coerce detainees into agreeing to a
search by implying that the detainee has no choice but to submit to a
search or be arrested. Nevertheless, such coerced searches will be
deemed to be legally voluntary even though the threat of arrest is greater
inducement than ignorance of the right to refuse or subtle coercion by the
detaining officer.
III. Analysis
Atwater v. City of Lago Vista was not a case about race and the
93. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 234 (1973).
94. Stephen J. Meyer & Norman D. Singleton, Automobile 'Consent' Searches:
Fact, Fiction and the Law, THE CHAMPION, May 1996, at 14. Stephen J. Meyer and
Norman D. Singleton assert that consent searches are frequently employed by officers
hoping to interrupt drug trafficking on the nation's highways. Id. at 14. During such
stops, officers -often look inside the stopped vehicle to see if there are any "supposed
indicators of drug trafficking such as fast food bags, cellular phones, and air fresheners."
Id. at 15. The officer then asks consent to search the automobile by asking whether there
are "any drugs or guns in the car." Id. When the occupants answer "no," the officer asks
if they "mind if [the officer] take[s] a look." Id.
95. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 231.
96. New Jersey v. Carty, 790 A.2d 903, 911 (N.J. 2002).
97. Id. (citing Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 438 (1991)).
98. State constitutions may limit the power of police officers to obtain consent from
a detainee. The New Jersey Supreme Court has held that the New Jersey Constitution
prohibits a police officer from procuring consent to search following a valid traffic stop
"unless there is a reasonable and articulable suspicion to believe that an errant motorist or
passenger has engaged in, or is about to engage in, criminal activity." Id at 912.
99. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. 218.
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Fourth Amendment; nevertheless, under the Court's blanket rule, some
scholars speculate that it is likely that the Court's decision will
disproportionately affect Americans of minority races.
00
A. Racial Profiling and Racism in America
Despite the illegality of racial profiling as a law enforcement
tactic, 1°1 there is little doubt that the practice exists. 0 2 Racial profiling
occurs when an officer considers the race, ethnicity, or nationality of an
individual in making law enforcement decisions. 10 3  One of the most
frequent forms of racial profiling, commonly referred to as "Driving
While Black," or "DWB," occurs on America's highways. 10 4  This
phenomenon is often attributed to "the nation's stepped up war against
drugs" that began in the 1980s. 10 5 Many contend that the effort to
combat drug trafficking "created both spoken and unspoken policies for
targeting racial minorities."'
0 6
The effect of racial profiling on Americans of minority races has
been profound. 10 7  Many members of minority races believe that law
100. See generally Oliver, supra note 92.
101. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996). In Whren, the Court
identified the Fourteenth Amendment as the proper basis for protection from racial
profiling. Id. ("We of course agree with petitioners that the Constitution prohibits
selective enforcement of the law based on considerations such as race. But the
constitutional basis for objecting to intentionally discriminatory application of the laws is
the Equal Protection Clause, not the Fourth Amendment."). However, the Equal
Protection Clause is a "largely illusory protection." Oliver, supra note 92, at 1113-14.
As an initial matter, the Fourteenth Amendment is not necessarily a suitable means for
proving discrimination because the Equal Protection Clause requires a plaintiff to show
intent to discriminate on behalf of the government actor. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S.
229 (1976). Further, the Fourteenth Amendment provides no relief for victims of less-
than-purposeful discrimination. Id.
102. Press Release, Gallup Organization, Racial Profiling Is Seen as Widespread,
Particularly Among Young Black Men (Dec. 9, 1999) (reporting that fifty-nine percent of
American citizens believe that racial profiling is a widespread practice among law
enforcement officials), available at http://www.gallup.com/poll/releases/pr991209.asp;
see also Glasser, supra note 10, at 32 (arguing that racial profiling is "a national policy
that is training police all over this country to use traffic violations ... as an excuse to stop
and search people with dark skin").
103. Elizabeth A. Knight & William Kurnik, Racial Profiling in Law Enforcement:
The Defense Perspective on Civil Rights Litigation, THE BRIEF, Summer 200 1, at 16, 18.
104. Harris, supra note 8, at 546.
105. Lyle, supra note 35, at 248.
106. Id. In 1985, the Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles
issued guidelines on "The Common Characteristics of Drug Couriers." Id. State officers
were directed to be wary of rented cars, motorists who strictly obeyed traffic laws, drivers
wearing gold jewelry or drivers who do not "fit the vehicle," and members of ethnic
groups commonly associated with dealing drugs. Id.
107. Id. at 249 (noting that, in Chavez v. Illinois State Police, 251 F.3d 612 (7th Cir.
2001), the American Civil Liberties Union reported that Hispanics comprised less than
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enforcement officials unfairly target them because of the color of their
skin,108 a perception that has led many people of color to distrust law
enforcement officers.10 9 In addition, increased racial profiling efforts
have led to the victimization of many innocent people, leaving many
minority citizens feeling under-protected by America's laws." 10
Many minority citizens feel that the persecution that they
experience as a result of being racially profiled is not limited to law
enforcement, but also extends to the American judicial system."'
Professor Lawrence asserts: "Americans share a common historical and
cultural heritage in which racism has played and still plays a dominant
role." ' 2  The shared experience of racism greatly impacts American
society and has inevitably led to the formation of national values that are
based upon negative feelings about non-white persons." 3 Among most
white Americans, this "shared racism" is unconscious."l 4 Nevertheless,
unconscious racism pervades society in a way that results in the under-
protection of minorities in America." 5
Professor Lawrence suggests that the goal of the Equal Protection
Clause, to eradicate racism, cannot be achieved until the legal system
eight percent of the Illinois population and less than three percent of the population that
uses personal vehicles but that Hispanics represent twenty-three percent of those searched
by Illinois police officers).
108. Press Release, Gallup Organization, supra note 102 (reporting that nearly eighty
percent of African Americans believe that racial profiling is a widespread practice among
law enforcement officers).
109. Lyle, supra note 35, at 266.
110. Id.at 250.
111. See Lawrence, supra note 12, at 237; see also Lyle, supra note 35, at 274
(suggesting that courts would be able to make more equitable decisions if the judicial
system would recognize inherent racial bias among judges).
112. Lawrence, supra note 12, at 237.
113. Id.
114. Professor Lawrence believes that unconscious racism has two explanations:
First, Freudian theory states that the human mind defends itself against the
discomfort of guilt by denying or refusing to recognize those ideas, wishes, and
beliefs that conflict with what the individual has learned is good or right.
While our historical experience has made racism an integral part of our culture,
our society has more recently embraced an ideal that rejects racism as immoral.
When an individual experiences conflict between racist ideas and the societal
ethic that condemns those ideas, the mind excludes his racism from
consciousness. Second, the theory of cognitive psychology states that the
culture-including, for example, the media and an individual's parents, peers,
and authority figures-transmits certain beliefs and preferences. Because these
beliefs are so much a part of the culture, they are not experienced as explicit
lessons. Instead, they seem part of the individual's rational ordering of her
perceptions of the world.
Id. at 237-38.
115. See Lyle, supra note 35, at 247 (arguing that the American judicial system's
"race-neutral" policy produces inequitable results under the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments).
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recognizes "racism's primary source"-the human unconscious. 16 He
suggests that courts should apply a "cultural meaning" test to allegedly
racially discriminatory acts. 1 7  The cultural meaning test would
scrutinize governmental conduct to see whether the conduct "conveys a
symbolic message to which the culture attaches a racial significance."
'"18
A finding of racial significance by a court would be considered a finding
of racial bias, and thus would trigger strict scrutiny review."
9
B. The Effects of Atwater on the Fourth Amendment and Racial
Profiling
Many scholars have linked the growing problem of racial profiling
to the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 20  The
Supreme Court's decision in Whren v. United States has been decried as
a step "toward authoritarianism, toward racist policing, and toward a
view of minorities as criminals, rather than citizens.'' If so, then the
Atwater decision is one more step toward that end.
Like Whren, the Supreme Court's decision in Atwater carries with it
the possible erosion of Fourth Amendment liberties because of the
massive amount of discretion that the Court's rule imparts to police
officers. 122 Although the Atwater decision is not surprising in light of the
Court's recent Fourth Amendment cases, 123 the effects of Atwater are
nevertheless shocking. After Atwater, police officers have unbridled
discretion to arrest citizens "without articulating a single reason why
such action is appropriate.' 24 As Justice O'Connor noted in her dissent,
this means a police officer can stop a suspect upon probable cause, issue
a citation, and let the motorist continue on his or her way. 125 Or, if the
officer so chooses, the officer can arrest the driver, search the car and
any containers therein, and impound the car and inventory its contents.
12 6
116. Lawrence, supra note 12, at 238.
117. Id. at 246.
118. Id. at 247.
119. Id.
120. See Glasser, supra note 10; see also Harris, supra note 8.
121. Harris, supra note 8, at 547.
122. The Whren decision has been widely criticized for limiting Fourth Amendment
protections and infringing on civil liberties. See Shakow, supra note 17, at 628-29; see
also Lyle, supra note 35, at 256 (noting that Whren endorses an "ends-means" approach
to policing).
123. Shakow, supra note 17, at 628 (noting that many recent Supreme Court cases
have placed limits on Fourth Amendment liberties "in the face of increased public
pressure to crack down on crime").
124. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 372 (2001) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
125. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
126. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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The officer can also inflict humiliation by handcuffing and booking the
traffic offender.
127
Even more damaging than the retributive aspects of Atwater is its
effect on the Fourth Amendment consent doctrine. Police officers are
free to use their authority to coerce motorists to consent to a search of
their person and their vehicle in lieu of arrest. When faced with a choice
between arrest and a consensual search, most drivers are likely to permit
an officer to search their vehicle. Although many of these drivers will
consent to the search knowing that they have no criminal activity to hide,
the coerced consent to search, and the search itself, betray the stated
purpose of the Fourth Amendment-to prohibit unreasonable searches
and seizures.
The massive amount of discretion that Atwater vests in police
officers leads to another serious problem in that, by increasing the
probability of a search, the Atwater rule encourages officers to engage in
pretextual stops. Because an officer has the discretion to stop any
motorist who commits a traffic violation, officers can "pick and choose
among violators."' 28 Thus, a racially motivated officer can use a minor
traffic violation as a pretext to stop a driver who is a member of a
minority race. 29
The Court's willingness to expand police powers under the Fourth
Amendment also has serious consequences for the due process guarantee
of the Fourteenth Amendment.' 30  Some legal scholars worry that, by
failing to require constitutional scrutiny other than probable cause,13 1 the
Court has condoned "overly discretionary arrest policies.' 32 Not only
do "custodial arrests require no process other than a single officer's
assessment of probable cause,"' 133 this probable cause standard leaves
little room for judicial scrutiny of police actions. 34 Further, because the
Court's decision is likely to lead to an upsurge in racial profiling, a
practice that by its nature denies its victims equal protection of the laws,
the Atwater case has additional implication for the Fourteenth
127. Id. at 324.
128. Sean Hecker, Race and Pretextual Traffic Stops: An Expanded Role for Civilian
Review Board, 28 COLUM. HuM. RTs. L. REV. 551, 555 (1997).
129. Glasser, supra note 10, at 32.
130. See generally Leading Cases, supra note 16, at 336 (arguing that the Atwater
majority was wrong not to impose a standard higher than probable cause upon
discretionary arrests).
131. Id.at340.
132. Id. at 336. "But the Court failed to recognize that because modem police
practices have delinked many arrests from the trial process, police deprivations of liberty
warrant a residual due process scrutiny that would require facial invalidation of overly
discretionary arrest policies." Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 344.
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Amendment.
The effects that the Atwater rule will have on civil liberties far
outweigh the benefit of administrative convenience to the courts. 135 Not
only does the Atwater rule disserve the purposes of the Fourth
Amendment by expanding the scope of police powers governed by the
search and seizure clause, 136 in conjunction with Whren, Atwater
severely limits a victim's remedy under that amendment. Further, many
Americans will likely interpret the Atwater decision as Supreme Court
endorsement of racial profiling.
C. The Racial Meaning Inherent in Atwater
Although the Atwater decision is objectionable on Fourth
Amendment grounds, the real harm that results from the decision is the
potential for increased disparate treatment of minorities. Among the
decision's strongest critics will be proponents of cognitive psychology,
many of whom perceive that American society is burdened by
unconscious racism.1 37  To some scholars, like Professor Lawrence,
decisions like Atwater represent the perpetuation of unconscious racism
in American society because they contain subtle racial meanings.
3 8
From a cognitive psychological perspective, then, the most deleterious
effect of Atwater is that the Court's decision endorses racist tendencies
among Americans.
Professor Lawrence contends that government actions with inherent
racial meanings can be identified by applying the "cultural meaning"
test. 139 The cultural meaning test considers the effect of a government
135. It is important to note that states may provide their citizens with a higher level of
protection than that afforded by the United States Constitution. Sibron v. New York, 392
U.S. 40, 60-61 (1968) (states may develop laws regarding search and seizure but may not
authorize conduct that violates the Fourth Amendment). The Montana Constitution,
unlike the Fourth Amendment, prohibits police officers from making warrantless arrests
for nonjailable offenses except in special circumstances. State v. Bauer, 2001 MT 248,
36 P.3d 892 (2001). State v. Bauer involved a defendant who was arrested for a "minor
in possession" charge after being spotted running away from a police car. Id. 9 8, 36 P.3d
at 894. At the police station, the defendant was subjected to a search incident to his
arrest, during which the officer discovered cocaine in the defendant's pocket. Id. 9, 36
P.3d at 894. The Montana Supreme Court held that the cocaine could not be used as
evidence against the defendant because it was the fruit of an illegal seizure. Id. TT 32-34,
36 P.3d at 897. The court opined that a person stopped for a nonjailable offense "should
not be subjected to the indignity of an arrest and police station detention" when a citation
would serve the same interest of justice. Id. 33, 36 P.3d at 897.
136. Shakow, supra note 17, at 628.
137. Cognitive psychologists are not alone in alleging that unconscious racism
pervades American society; some Freudians and sociologists also subscribe to theories of
unconscious racism. See Johnson, supra note 12, at 1028.
138. Lawrence, supra note 12, at 238.
139. In his article The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
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action, as well as its context, in determining whether the action promotes
racism. 140 In Atwater, the Court's decision itself constitutes government
action. 141
Although Professor Lawrence has employed the test in the civil
context, it is equally instructive in understanding criminal cases.
142
Applying the test to Atwater demonstrates that the decision has racial
connotations. Because the Atwater case involved a white woman being
arrested by police, a racial meaning is not frequently associated with the
decision. Nevertheless, because the Atwater rule makes it easy for police
officers to perform pretextual stops, it is likely that the decision will lead
to an increase in racial profiling, and thus affect racial minorities more
than whites. 143 The racially disproportionate impact that the Atwater rule
is likely to have suggests that the government's action will be understood
by society as having a racial meaning.
The racially disparate impact of Atwater is not enough to satisfy the
cultural meaning test, however.44 According to Professor Lawrence, the
cultural meaning test also requires evidence of "something in the
particulars of [the governmental action's] historical and cultural context
Unconscious Racism, Professor Lawrence applied the cultural meaning test to
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). In Davis, two African-Americans alleged
that the hiring practices of the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department
discriminated against minorities in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 234. The
basis of the discrimination claim was "Test 21," a written examination given to test the
verbal ability, vocabulary, reading, and comprehension skills of police department
applicants.. Id. at 234-35. The plaintiffs alleged that "Test 21" discriminated against
blacks because African Americans failed the test at a rate four times that of the white
failure rate. Id. at 237. Applying the cultural meaning test to Davis, Professor Lawrence
found "Test 21" to be the result of unconscious racism. Lawrence, supra note 12, at 251-
54. Professor Lawrence found that "an action that has no racial meaning in one context
may have significant racial meaning in another." Id. at 25 1. Thus, even though "Test
2 1" itself was not associated with race, the historical and cultural situation in which the
test occurred had racial connotations. Id First, he noted the racially disproportionate
impact that "Test 2 1" had on African Americans. Id. Second, he asserted that the racial
meaning of the action derived from "the particulars of its historical and cultural context."
Id. In Davis, Professor Lawrence found two such elements: the nature of the activity from
which African Americans had been excluded-policing in a primarily black
community-and the officers' failure to demonstrate proficiency in verbal and writing
skills, which would commonly be construed by the public as "testimony to the inherent
intellectual abilities of racial groups to which the test takers belong." Id.
140. Lawrence, supra note 12, at 247.
141. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948) (holding that judicial enforcement
of a racially restrictive covenant constituted state action for purposes of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
142. Johnson, supra note 12, at 1032 (noting that examining criminal cases
contributes to the theory of unconscious racism because criminal procedure cases provide
documentation of unconscious racism).
143. Leading Cases, supra note 16, at 342.
144. Lawrence, supra note 12, at 253.
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that causes us to interpret this action-at least intuitively-in racial
terms."'145 The cultural and historical context in which the Atwater case
transpired supports the theory that the decision has intrinsic racial
connotations. There are two cultural elements that influence the way
Americans will interpret the Court's action in Atwater. The first is the
propensity of society to tolerate racial profiling. The second relates to
the criminal nature of the offense dealt with in Atwater.
It is significant that the Court's decision in Atwater took place in a
time when the American consciousness toward racial profiling was
heightened. In the wake of Whren and the terror attacks against America
on September 11, 2001, racial profiling has received extensive media
coverage. 146  As a result, a large percentage of American society has
come to accept racial profiling by law enforcement officers as a way of
life. Despite the fact that eighty-one percent of Americans disapprove of
the practice of racial profiling, 147 little has been done to combat profiling
as a law enforcement practice. For example, although sufficient
evidence exists that racial profiling is a reality in many states, 148 no
action has been taken by the federal government to combat this growing
problem. 149 This indicates a willingness on the part of American citizens
to accept racial profiling as a law enforcement tool. Against this
background, the Atwater decision can be construed as having racial
meaning because the case has a tendency to perpetuate cultural beliefs
145. Id.at251.
146. Lyle, supra note 35, at 248; see also Gregory M. Lipper, Recent Development:
Racial Profiling, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 551, 553 (2001) (remarking that efforts to
publicize racial profiling included a widespread advertising campaign by the American
Civil Liberties Union that urged support for a congressional bill providing for the
collection of data on traffic stops).
147. A Gallup Organization study showed that eighty percent of whites and eighty-
seven percent of blacks condemned racial profiling by police officers. Press Release,
Gallup Organization, supra note 102.
148. "Studies conducted in New York City, Maryland, Dallas and Los Angeles all
revealed evidence that police officers stop African-American motorists at a
disproportionate rate." Lipper, supra note 146, at 552.
149. Id. at 552-53. In 1997, Representative John Conyers introduced the Traffic
Stops Statistics Act of 1997. H.R. 118, 105th cong. (1997). Although the bill passed the
House of Representatives in 1998, the Senate failed to vote on it. Representative Conyers
reintroduced the bill in 1999, but neither the House nor the Senate passed it. H.R. 1443,
106th Cong. (1999). On June 6, 2001, the End Racial Profiling Act was reintroduced in
the House and in the Senate. H.R. 2074, 107th cong. (2001); S. 989, 107th Cong. (2001).
The bill called for federal law enforcement agencies to maintain policies to eliminate
racial profiling and to cease existing practices that encourage racial profiling. Id. Such
policies included a prohibition on racial profiling, the collection of data on routine traffic
stops, submission of that data to the Attorney General, procedures for receiving,
investigating, and responding meaningfully to complaints alleging racial profiling by law
enforcement agents, and procedures to discipline agents who engage in racial profiling.
Id. The bill also provided federal grants to states that adhere to these guidelines. Id.
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about the tolerability of racial profiling.
It is also significant that the Atwater rule involves criminal
behavior. In American society, criminal actions, and therefore criminals,
are often associated with persons of minority races. 150 Actions by the
government that reinforce these stereotypes adopt a racial meaning in the
eyes of American citizens. By ignoring the racial implications of the
Atwater case, the majority opinion has the effect of endorsing the belief
that persons of color are more likely than whites to engage in criminal
activity. 151 In addition, in the eyes of law enforcement officials, the
Atwater rule reinforces the notion that searches of minority drivers are
more likely to yield illegal contraband. Thus, the Atwater rule increases
the probability that minorities will be stigmatized as criminals simply
because they are part of a certain racial group.
The Supreme Court's willingness to demonize a "soccer mom" for
failing to buckle her children's seatbelts does not bode well for members
of minority races in America. The contrast between Ms. Atwater and the
average black male that will be subject to an Atwater-type arrest is
indicative of the racial meaning behind the case. Unlike Gail Atwater, a
non-threatening white woman, most drivers who will be victimized under
the Atwater rule will likely be members of minority races. By
sanctioning Ms. Atwater's arrest, the Supreme Court damned many
innocent minority drivers and paved the way for officials like Officer
Turek, who misuse their arrest power as a means of "deterrence,
retribution, and order-maintainence. '152
150. Lawrence, supra note 12, at 252 (noting that, from the perspective of white
Americans, the job of law enforcement officers historically has been "to protect the lives
and property of whites who perceive blacks as the primary potential source of violence
and crime"); see Lawrence Vogleman, The Big Black Man Syndrome: The Rodney King
Trial and the Use of Racial Stereotypes in the Courtroom, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 517,
573 (1993) (describing the "Big Black Man" syndrome as the perpetuation of stereotypes
that characterize African Americans as criminals and drug dealers); see also DAVID COLE,
No EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 4
(1999) (noting that the incarceration rate among African Americans is seven times that of
white Americans, that African Americans make up a disproportionate percentage of the
population of American prisons, and that African Americans "serve longer sentences,
have higher arrest and conviction rates, face higher bail amounts, and are more often the
victims of police use of deadly force than white citizens").
151. See Lyle, supra note 35. Peter A. Lyle asserts that the "race-neutral" approach
to Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims "ignores existing racial attitudes and
potential discriminatory animus in law enforcement." Id. at 247. He further contends
that, "sociologically speaking, the 'raceignorant' approach might well be an indication,
not only that judges misapply constitutional remedies, but also that their own racial biases
pervade and corrupt supposedly neutral standards of reasonableness." Id. at 261.
152. Leading Cases, supra note 16, at 344.
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IV. Conclusion
The Court's opinion in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista is flawed in
two major aspects. First, the majority's reliance on common law
reasoning completely ignores the disparate impact that the Atwater rule is
likely to have on minority races. Racial concerns were not an issue at
common law; thus, the Framers of the United State Constitution did not
explicitly provide for protection of minorities in the Bill of Rights. In the
centuries since the drafting of the Constitution, however, racial issues
have been a major social and political force in the United States. The
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868 plainly reveals the extent
to which racial issues have shaped American law. 153 By adhering to the
original intent of the Framers, the Atwater majority downplayed the
importance that race plays in American society and ignored the role of
racial tensions in American history.
Second, by adopting a bright-line rule the Supreme Court has
abandoned the purpose of the Fourth Amendment, which is to prevent
unreasonable searches and seizures. The Court's willingness to adhere to
a bright-line rule is in direct conflict with prior Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, which mandates a case-by-case analysis to determine
whether a search and seizure is reasonable. 5 4 The Supreme Court has
repeatedly adhered to the logic that "rigid and unthinking" rules violate
the principles underlying the Fourth Amendment. 55 Further, as Justice
O'Connor noted in her dissenting opinion in Atwater, a rule "requir[ing]
a legitimate reason for the decision to escalate the seizure into a full
custodial arrest ... does not undermine an otherwise 'clear and simple'
rule.' 56
Notably, the Court has rejected bright-line tests in other areas of
constitutional law. The seemingly clear rule set forth in Miranda v.
Arizona157 has been blurred over time to require courts to balance a
153. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, cl. 1 ("No state shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.")
154. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) ("The scheme of the Fourth
Amendment becomes meaningful only when it is assured that at some point the conduct
of those charged with enforcing the laws can be subjected to the more detached, neutral
scrutiny of a judge who must evaluate the reasonableness of a particular search or seizure
in light of the particular circumstances.") (emphasis added).
155. Id. at 15-16.
156. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 366 (2001) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
157. 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (requiring police officers to advise criminal suspects of
their rights to remain silent and to obtain counsel as a constitutional prerequisite to
admissibility of incriminating statements in court).
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suspect's interest in not incriminating himself against the government's
interest in punishing criminals.
158
Of additional significance is the majority's willingness to adopt a
bright-line rule that favors governmental interests over individual
rights. 159 According to Justice Souter, a bright-line rule is necessary for
administrative convenience.1 60  Interestingly, Ms. Atwater herself
suggested to the Court a bright-line rule, "one not necessarily requiring
violent breach of the peace, but nonetheless forbidding custodial arrest,
even upon probable cause, when the conviction could not ultimately
carry any jail time and when the government shows no compelling need
for immediate detention." 16' Further, as Justice O'Connor aptly
remarked in her dissent, clarity "by no means trumps the values of liberty
and privacy at the heart of the [Fourth] Amendment's protections."'
162
Atwater is more than just bad precedent; as Justice O'Connor noted,
it is a decision fraught with "potentially serious consequences for the
everyday lives of Americans.' ' 163 As in Whren, the Supreme Court in
Atwater declined the opportunity to use the Fourth Amendment to
restrain instances of arbitrary law enforcement by police officers, 164 and,
consequently, many Americans will find themselves victims of arbitrary
police harassment. Further, the Atwater decision is a sad reminder of the
racism that is still very much a part of American society. Atwater makes
it clear that the "existence of racial discrimination distorts our
perceptions about the causes of discrimination and leads us to think
about racism in a way that advances the disease rather than combatting
158. See Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292 (1990) (holding that warning rule applied
only in coercive interrogatory situations; where officers are undercover there is no
coercion and therefore no need for warnings); Quarles v. New York, 467 U.S. 649, 656
(1984) ("Whatever the motivation of individual officers in such a situation, we do not
believe that the doctrinal underpinnings of Miranda require that it be applied in all its
rigor to a situation in which police officers ask questions reasonably prompted by a
concern for public safety"); Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039 (1983) (holding that
police officer may reinitiate interrogation of suspect if suspect demonstrates willingness
to discuss investigation generally); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (holding
that statement inadmissible against criminal defendant may still be used to impeach
defendant).
159. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 347; see also Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 817
(1996) (rejecting a balancing test in favor of bright-line rule that probable cause gives
police officers the right to search and seize).
160. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 347.
161. Id. at 346. The majority dismissed Ms. Atwater's proposed rule as "not
ultimately so simple" because of the "complications" arising from "the possible
applications of the several criteria ... for drawing a line between minor crimes with
limited arrest authority and others not so restricted." Id. at 348.
162. Id. at 366 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
163. Id. at 371 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
164. Hecker, supra note 128, at 604.
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it.
165
It is therefore time for the Supreme Court to rethink its Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence regarding traffic stops. In order to be truly
race-neutral, judges should apply a "reasonable officer" rule as the
standard by which the reasonableness of traffic stops is measured. By
doing so, judges will ensure equitable results under the Fourth
Amendment.
165. Lawrence, supra note 12, at 239.
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